Why People Underprepare for Natural Hazard? (2)

disaster

Behavioral economics provides some clues. 

In fact, behavioral science has contributed much to the understanding of decision-making in the last few decades. It has revealed that our perceptions, preferences, choices and behaviors are often influenced by heuristics and cognitive biases. Research on the psychology of natural hazards and decision biases influencing hazard mitigation has been driven by Howard Kunreuther, Robert Meyer, Erwann Michel-Kerjan at the Wharton Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes at the University of Pennsylvania. Their analysis of the decision-making during natural disasters – mostly in the US context – has found that key behavioral biases and heuristics, play a great role in people’ reluctance to invest in mitigation measures. In their chapter (Kunreuther, et al., 2013) identify eight psychological biases and situational barriers that shape such decisions and hence limit people’s willingness to invest in hazard mitigation measures.

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To better understand why residents often act against their own interest and underprepare for natural disaster, let’s attempt to address the following questions: (1) Do residents in hazard-prone areas feel at risk? (2) Are they good forecasters? (3) Will they procrastinate?

(1) Do residents in hazard-prone areas feel at risk?

Well, the residents’ perception and response to future disasters is greatly influenced by the way they construe those events over time. Residents’ safety (and hence their need for risk prevention) is often recognized as a desirable goal (Higher-level construal). However, is safety worthy of investment?  Crudely, yes it is. Nonetheless, such investment becomes unfeasible as soon as hazard mitigation is framed as a near-future (lower-level construal) undertaking (Liberman, 2003). In fact, for many residents (landlords and tenants), installing mitigation measures might not be affordable in the short-run. They tend to overweight upfront mitigation costs and value their outcomes differently over time.

Are they good forecasters? (3) Will they procrastinate? (To be continued)

Notes: 
Kunreuther, H., Meyer, R., & Michel-Kerjan. E. (2013). Overcoming Decision Biases to Reduce Losses from Natural Catastrophes. In E. Shafir (Ed.), The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy (pp. 399-413). New Jersey, NJ. Princeton University Press.
Trope, Y. & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal Construal. Psychological Review, 110 (3), 403- 421.

Why People Underprepare for Natural Hazard?

Natural hazards are major adverse events resulting from natural processes. Natural disaster can cause loss of life or property damage, the severity of which depends on the affected population’s resilience and their ability to recover. They are fundamentally unpredictable and low probability events.


It has been widely recognized that the human and economic losses from natural disasters have been increasing drastically over the last three decades. These catastrophic losses are mostly driven by the population density and concentration of economic assets in disaster-prone areas (tropical coasts and river deltas, near forests and along earthquake fault lines). The US coast represents a microcosm of the world urbanization exposed to natural hazards.

In fact, its East Coast, from New York to Texas through Florida, hosted more than 36% of the total population in (US Census, 2010), and nearly $8.3 trillion of insured and hurricane-prone assets (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). Along with Robert Meyer, they were intrigued by the mismatch between the increasing investment in hazard prone areas such as the waterfront development on the coasts and the under-investment in risk-reduction and mitigation measures (Kunreuther, 2013). They related people’s failure to mitigate against natural hazards to some fundamental decision biases that can’t be explained by the mainstream micro-economics theory, mostly accounting for maximizing utilities with no attention to people’s perception and behavior toward risks. In addition, they associated these behavioral biases, along with the government’s post-disaster relief, to what they called a “natural disaster syndrome”.

What are the features of the “natural disaster syndrome”? What are these cognitive decision biases? What drivers hinder residents’ investment in hazard’s way? (To be continued)

NOTE: The photos are drawn from http://www.hurricanekatrina.com

How to explain OM in 2 minutes…

I was intrigued withOM logo the question of “how to explain Outcome Mapping (OM) in 2 minutes?”, as it takes me –like many other program evaluators- hours to address this question! Nevertheless, challenged to describe the approach to non-OM conversant, I tend to highlight key features to distinguish OM from other tools. Ideally I tend not to bombard the client/ discussant with OM terminology. I prefer to speak the conventional evaluation notion/ language, and often match and supplement it with OM-specific terms/ notions (such as BP~ stakeholders; progress markers ~ indicators, etc…). Here is my 2 cents input:

OM’s power is that it uncover the unintended outcomes that the project/ program contributes to in a complex dynamic system (typical of any development project/ program). Something that other tools overlook!

  1. Conceptually:
    • Unintended outcomes relate to BP partners’ behaviors (usually I use the term stakeholders or partners/ actors to introduce Boundary partners BP notion). These outcomes are a key guarantee for sustaining the intervention’s effects in a community. These are the earnings that communities will accumulate and use.
    • Contribution rather than attribution: (1) since in a dynamic system, actors are exposed to various factors that shape/ influence/ and affect their behaviors; (2) we can’t isolate one intervention and chase it to evaluate its effects (we are not experimenting in-vitro!)
  2. Methodologically- as a tool:
    • It provides another check on the intervention outcomes by revisiting and redefining them as they emerge in real-time interventions through the theory of change framework
    • It provides  a realistic narrative of the intervention linking project intended outputs and outcomes  with unintended ones.
    • Its provides an appropriate mapping of partners/ actors involved in the intervention
    • OM Map is essential tool to trace the changes through the progress markers. It is fundamental in the next planning cycle.

I conclude in nutshell that OM provides the opportunity to look at the intervention inductively. I believe this is a great learning opportunity for clients to match their deductive approach in planning with the OM inductive lens! It is definitely an eye opener for program evaluators and actors too.

This is my quick take on OM. Am I done in 2 minutes?

As I member of the http://www.outcomemapping.ca/members/4494, the blog reacts to a questions raised on the OM community forum http://www.outcomemapping.ca

Managing conflicts flexibly on a “welfare state” barometer

In addressing whether the Canadian “welfare state” model contributes to conflict resolution or exacerbate conflict, i would argue that Canada has been managing political conflicts flexibly on its “welfare state” barometer.

There is a consencanada-flagsus that government as the legitimate authority is “a set of institutions that make and enforce collective, public decisions for a society” (Dyck, p.5). These decisions – of different shape and forms – are perceived to be binding and necessary for the benefit of the society as a whole. They are anticipated to manage the “society-government” interactions if taken from a “Public Choice” and “State-centered” perspectives; as well as the “society-society” dynamics and expectations – if considered from a “Pluralism” and “Class Analysis” perspectives.

These decisions and policies are largely influenced by internal “cleavages” driven by a wide spectrum of social, economic, political and cultural dynamics and issues, as well as external factors such as globalization, international commitments, and global events and shifts of power, among others. They are dynamics and subject to change over time across the political and demographic spectrum of preferences and priorities.

Challenged with escalating and sometimes competing citizen’s demands, authorities might not be able to accommodate the various issues raised. This may contribute to widening the political divide among the various social fabrics, hence erupting some level of conflict.

I would argue that the changing role of the Canadian state on the welfare state barometer is a reflection of the various forms of competing and conflicting factors influenced by changing internal and external pressures over time. In that sense, government policy evolved from mere regulation and overseeing of rights into concrete interventions with the “Great Depression”. It was then pushed further into service provision by the Keynesian post-1930 drive. Since then, I would argue Canada has managed conflicts flexibly within its adopted “welfare state policy” framework. This is illustrated by the swinging of the government policy between a Keynesian-advocated welfare state in the 1950s, to a more liberal model in the 1980s, and back to a welfare state –believed to be best fit to the post-2008 crisis. (to be continued…)

The missing partner in the Arab post-2015 development (SDGs) agenda

In the context of the post 2015 development agenda and in the lead toward adopting the sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in September 2015, the multi-stakeholder debates have focused lately on two critical enablers for sustainable development – namely “Financing for Development- FfD” and the “Data Revolution”.

The post 2015 process has been qualified to be consultative, participatory and bottom-up making serious efforts to learn from the pitfalls of the MDGs. From a monitoring and evaluation perspective, the MDGs reporting was constrained by data coverage and representation, lag in reporting and weak national statistical capacity, besides being donors’ driven. To that end, the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons (HLP) in its 2013 report on the post 2015 agenda concluded that lack of data has hampered development efforts, and that monitoring and evaluation “[at all levels and in all processes of development] will help guide decision making, update priorities and ensure accountability”. The report then called for a “data revolution” that would enable overseeing the implementation of the 17 SDGs (through more than 100 indicators[1] identified so-far).

Data revolution, as promoted by the HLP and the SDSN[2], is happening and is shaped by technological innovation. The challenge is to leverage it to ensure (1) high-quality data, (2) unified definition and conceptualization, (3) timeliness of reporting in order to serve and improve real-time decision-making and implementation.  The key challenges in this regard revolve around developing the capabilities, resources and principles that would harness blending and integrating the traditional data and data sources with the emerging ones and while devising means to ensure their reliability.

In the Arab region (Middle East and North Africa), the efforts have been marginally successful in monitoring and evaluating the MDGs. A recently commissioned study[3] by UNESCWA revealed no news by concluding that, on average, Arab countries produced official statistics for almost 50% of the 45 MDG indicators they used to report. The remaining was done on an ad-hoc basis through the UN or other funding agencies. The report questioned the region’s readiness for monitoring, reporting and ultimately evaluating the post 2015 era. It highlighted key challenges related to the following M&E foundations:

  • Institutional- mostly related to Sustainable Development data compilation and reporting mandate. Nationally, instead of being directly linked to the center of government, reporting on the sustainable development is often mandated to either the ministry of social affairs or environment (mostly to the latter). The same applies regionally with the League of Arab States council of the ministers of the environment. Besides, the institutional challenge reflect on the processes, hence the lack of integration both nationally with the national statistics offices, and weak coordination regionally.
  • Capacity – directly influenced by the institutional challenge too. It is mostly related to the availability of resources (human and financial), associated with lack of interest (compared to the governments’ focus ns fascination by the macroeconomic indicators), lack of knowledge, and weak coordination.
  • Quality of the collected data – mostly related to its (a) representation nationally and sub-nationally; (B) comparability given the variation with the set/ agreed upon definitions and concepts; (c) limiting its benchmarking with others; (d) timeliness of the data and (e) accessibility.
  • Measurement approaches and methodologies – mostly too conventional with high emphasis on quantitative/ numeric indicators and less interest in the qualitative aspects associated with capturing the learnings, institutionalizing the knowledge and exploring unintended outcomes.

It is worth noting that these attributes of the Arab M&E and statistical capabilities have long been overseen by the various partners when reporting on the MDGs. MDG related reports were mostly objective and target- driven. Yet, when addressing the development enablers, the identified weak SD governance and processes fail to highlight the monitoring and evaluation elements.

In parallel to the global and regional consultations in preparation for the post-2015 development agenda, lead evaluation networks have promoted and facilitated the establishment of VOPEs[4] worldwide, and advocated for declaring 2015 the International Year of Evaluation. These efforts were timely. VOPEs have emerged as primary stakeholders whose expertise, capability and mandate (mostly related to advocating for high-quality, reliable, relevant and timely monitoring and evaluation processes) are cornerstones to foster informed decision-making.

In MENA, the Evaluation Network and its associated national VOPEs (Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan and Tunisia, among others) have been established (officially registered) to support good governance and influence evidence-based decision-making through advocating and mainstreaming monitoring and evaluation. The booming of these organizations in the region seized the “Arab Uprising” momentum, responded to necessities and envisioned to fill in gaps – same gaps identified above – which were for long undermined. Over the last 4 years, evaluation has been recognized widely in the MENA region and has earned a broader visibility and greater emphasis by various development stakeholders – primarily among governments, parliamentarians and international organizations.

Fundamentally, the evaluation societies in the region share a common mission aiming at addressing the institutional, data quality methodologies. They are mandate to mainstream M&E, promote non-conventional M&E theories and approaches, and advance M&E standards and practices. They are well equipped to build capacity and provide the quality resources needed to keep close eye on the SDGs. They are well positioned to contextualize and provide a use-based analysis drawn from any M&E system – even those highly ICT-driven. They are the actors without whom “data revolution” will turn inefficient. Yet, to-date, they have not been harnessed! In fact, the various regional consultations on the SDGs and post 2015 agenda (both government- led or UN-led over the last 3 years) has fallen short in engaging the emerging evaluation community in MENA. It is time for post-2015 agenda custodians to tap into such resource…

It is always time for the MENA VOPEs to strive to push the M&E component and devise innovative means to lead the post-2015 M&E agenda forward…

[1] Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html) (Accessed June 30, 2015)

[2] Sustainable Development Solution Network

[3] Measuring sustainable Development in the Arab Region, UNESCWA, 2015

[4] Voluntary Organizations for Program Evaluation

Evaluating Evalpartners: some reflections

IYE 2015I participated in the webinar run last week on the findings of the first external evaluation of EvalPartners. The evaluation, done by both Nancy and Sarah, provides a broad snapshot of what EvalPartners is and does with the intention to shape decisions about what EvalPartners could be and achieve beyond 2015 (the International Year of Evaluation). The presentation highlighted the key findings around Evalpartners functions (the initiatives it has been managing), and its institutional set up. Yet most of the recommendations addressed the latter.

I see the report an eye opener for all of us within the Evalpartners network, I learned a lot and am reflecting! But it is definitely beyond that for Evalpartners’ management. By addressing the gaps, the report has highlighted key programs Evalpartners is managing, yet indirectly provoked many questions that help shape the future agenda. These seem more relevant within the context of Evalpartners’ strategic discussions. I am happy it already caught the immediate attention of Evalpartners’ management and triggered the management response.  I trust the below will be insightful too in such “big picture” discussions.

There is a clear acknowledgment that EvalPartners is a young global movement with loose boundaries within the evaluation landscape. Driven by champions, it emerged from on strong partnership between UNICEF and IOCE. It has emerged in becoming the global network and has succeeded in reaching out to a wide set of partners within the government, civil society and international organizations spheres.  I think its branding and affinity to attract such a wide array of partners stems from its intrinsic structural format. This is not a call to undermine the well -crafted governance recommendations. Yet, it is a flag to be raised when engineering its governance. A too-structured network adds to existing ones. Rigidity might create a barrier to outreach with other networks, hence triggers a competing rather than a collective spirit.  Of course more transparency in decision making and implementation processes, as elegantly suggested by the report, are fundamental to promote Evalpartners as the “network of networks”.

MillGoals01On another side, the key issues identified in the report unveil critical aspects that would ensure the network’s sustainability and added value in the international evaluation landscape. Yet from a program perspective, there has been an opportunity to highlight strategic thematic directions that promote its mandate and relevance. I am happy to hear Ziad (IOCE president) addressing this dimension in his intervention in the webinar.  Yet, I believe there is still a prospect for Evalpartners to build on the momentum created around the coincidence between the international year of evaluation and launching the sustainable development goals (SDGs). The network is capable through its web of regional and national VOPEs to drive the post 2015 development agenda’s enablers and implementation mechanisms. It would be of great value to further explore the network’s future directions in the context of the post 2015 agenda. Indeed the latter is hugely enabled by innovative evaluation capabilities, transformative policies and implementation mechanisms. Though the clock is ticking, there are a couple of months to pitch in with contributions on the data and evaluation capability among others to inform global decisions (scheduled for September 2015). Platforms will then emerge and huge efforts are needed to gear the SGDs implementation globally, regionally and
nationally in the next decade. I am confident Evalpartners is up to it. Evalpartners will smartly align its programs within the context of the post 2015 development agenda… VOPEs will follow… Everyone will follow…

Mapping civil society in Lebanon: some critical observations

11050738_853256824730560_6776181994540508042_nI received like many other practitioners and interested in civil society the report “Mapping civil society in Lebanon” recently published by the Civil Society Facility South, funded by the European Union and conducted by Beyond Reform and Development. The report is definitely another serious attempt to understand the current landscape of civil society in Lebanon. It is an eye opener, yet it prompts questions rather than provides answers. (It is worth thanking BRD for putting the report to the public. This definitely reflect a high level of professionalism and transparency, but more importantly an indirect call for comment and feedback to better serve the policy-making process in Lebanon)

Driven by my interest in research and passion about CSO role in policy development/ dialogue, I am posting a contribution that aims at the better understanding the sector and its challenges. The post intends to be critical about the findings with the intention of enriching the discussion and shedding light on dimensions worth exploring in order to promote and find leverage for civil society to influence policy-making.

  • Approach: The report seems to be too descriptive to the extent that it falls short of providing a critical analysis of the current situation of Lebanese civil society. There is a tendency in the report to present the findings without qualifying them and analyzing their relevance. In addition, the report tends to furnish a wish-list of “valid” recommendations that address serious gaps and resonate well with the CSO community and the practitioners. Yet they seem to be disconnected from the findings! The eminent question is: what are the bases of the suggested recommendations?
  • Scope: There are some conflicting messages. On one hand, the report describes its methodology as inclusive with a sample of 10% of the total registered CSOs; while acknowledging that the 10% represent the active ones (page 23). On the other hand, it concludes (page 47) that the “Civil society actors in this report are those organizations and groups contributing to civic participation and inclusive governance, as such faith-based and partisan non-governmental organizations are excluded from the study”. The report can’t claim to map the Lebanese civil society. Its findings however help to draw trends.
  • On the history of CSO in Lebanon: it would be advisable that the report adds the volunteering dimension to the evolution it describes. Findings suggest that the level of volunteering and its spirit tends to dwindle as we move into the post 2005 era. Most recently, the activism and policy influence dimension (post 2005) is paralleled with another “contracting-like” dimension! This is worth further exploration! It is observed that it is mostly triggered by the Syrian crisis and the influx of Syrians into the Lebanese territory on one hand, and induced by the shift in the international organizations attention and consequently their fund allocation. Many CSOs with no mandate or experience in relief work seized the opportunity were tempted to apply for funds, and got contracted to deliver services. This is a typical shift toward a “contractor” mindset.
  • CSOs governance and internal challenges: the report suggests many internal organizational and governance challenges, yet did not address the emerging “undemocratic” and “authoritarian” tendencies. It is observed that many CSO management board remains on board for long. It is worth addressing and analyzing such undemocratic practices that might have multiple causes mostly associated with a cultural paternalistic attitude, loose government monitoring and oversight, limited constituencies, lack of internal processes, and increasing opportunity to use a CSO as a money generating tool (with the emerging of the “contracting” mindset). Besides, among the intrinsic internal challenges are: the lack of trust, political and sectarian affiliation, inability to capture and manage knowledge, lack of professionalism, lack of transparency …
  • The external challenges: it is evident how the security situation is perceived as the most eminent external challenge affecting the work of CSOs. Yet, considering the political context a challenge needs to be further analyzed.
  • Legal framework: There is general consensus among scholars and practitioners that the Lebanese law of association is one of the most progressive laws in the region, though it is a 100 year old. The report acknowledges that, and calls for reforming the law. This needs further elaboration, as it might be a window of introducing stringent requirements by the government. It would more appropriate to call for redesigning the processes to ensure transparency among others… besides, the report refers to “unfavorable legal framework” as a challenge facing CSOs without qualifying this framework and what is unfavorable about it!.
  • Advocating for policy change: It is reported that CSOs failed to lobby and advocate for policy change because it can’t generate a general public opinion/ pressure. It is worth exploring other factors such as (1) the ambiguous policy processes, (2) the lack of coordination with media, (3) lack of trust in CSOs for political or sectarian affiliation.
  • Monitoring and Evaluation: There is a global trend to promote M&E and performance management, yet there was no reference to improve/ enhance the monitoring and evaluation functions of the CSOs, both internally at the level of the organization and its programs, and externally at the level of government’s plans and programs. This is a dimension that is worth exploring in terms of capabilities as well as a tool to influence policy. Besides, the report does not make any reference to the audit function within the organizations.
  • The recommendations: the report lays down a wish-list of recommendations that are needed to further empower CSOs in Lebanon. They seem to be valid, yet the link between these recommendations and the findings is not clear.
  • The general recommendations: they might need further attention and reconsideration:
    1. CSO involvement in policy development is primarily pending developing a CSO-policy makers partnership policy that describes the relationships, lays down the process and sets the requirements for such engagement
    2. What is the link between “result-based strategy” and the list of goals suggested? There seems to be a mismatch and lack of alignment. It is worth revisited.

I hope the above review triggers a constructive discussion to develop and promote a partnership policy that recognizes the engagement of the civil society in decision making at all levels in Lebanon.